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Abstract
The incentive and project selection eﬀects of agent anonymity are investigated in a set-
ting where an evaluator observes a subjective noisy signal of project quality. Although the
evaluator cannot commit ex ante to an acceptance criterion, she decides up front between
informed review, where the agent’s ability is directly observable, or blind review, where
it is not. An ideal acceptance criterion for the evaluator balances the goals of incentive
provision and project selection. Relative to this, informed review results in an excessively
steep equilibrium acceptance policy: the standard applied to low-ability agents is too strin-
gent and the standard applied to high ability agents is too lenient. Blind review in which
all types face the same standard often provides better incentives, but it ignores valuable
information for selecting projects. In general, the evaluator prefers a policy of blind (resp.
informed) review when the ability distribution is suﬃciently skewed toward high (resp.
low) types or the agent’s payoﬀ from acceptance is suﬃciently high (resp. low).
Keywords: fairness, discrimination, peer eﬀect, incentives.
JEL: C73, D02, D81.
Before Paris, nobody drank our wine. Well, friends did. But their palates were :::
less discriminating.
–Bill Pullman as Jim Barrett in Bottle Shock.
1 Introduction
The settings in which an evaluator must rely only on her subjective impressions to assess
output or performance are diverse and ubiquitous. In cultural environments individuals are
asked to evaluate: wine, food, art, poetry, movies, and music. In retail settings experts and
panel participants review a vast array of consumer products. In criminal trials and lawsuits
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1juries are charged with weighing evidence. And in academia, faculty evaluate: exams, projects,
and manuscripts. Given that subjective evaluation is endemic to so many signiﬁcant situa-
tions, it is important to understand what elements add or detract from its eﬃcacy. A crucial
question in this regard is whether or not the reviewer should be permitted to use supplemen-
tal information such as the applicant’s identity and prior record in the current evaluation, i.e.,
should the reviewer be “informed” or “blind”?
At ﬁrst glance, the answer to this question may seem obvious: given that it is an individual’s
output or performance – and not his/her innate ability – that is being evaluated, the review
process should be blind whenever feasible in order to minimize bias. Note, however, that not
all “bias” is bad. Because evaluation is often inherently noisy, an eﬀective use of information
may well dictate that individuals with stronger track records face lower standards. Indeed, the
mode of review, blind or informed, varies both across and within evaluation settings.
Wine tasting, for example, is virtually always performed blind. In 1976 a now famous blind
tasting, known as the judgment of Paris, is credited with dispelling the widely held belief
that ﬁne French wines were superior to those produced in California.1 Similarly, in classical
music, Goldin and Rouse (2000) note that most major U.S. symphony orchestras adopted some
form of blind auditioning for hiring new members in the 1970s and 80s. Likewise, consumer
products ranging from hi-ﬁ stereo equipment2 to shampoo3 are evaluated under conditions of
blind review.
Settings in which a mixture of blind and informed review are performed include criminal
trials, grading exams, and evaluating scholarly manuscripts for publication. In court proceed-
ings, judges often, but not always, allow jurors to hear evidence on related crimes by the
defendant, known as propensity or similar fact evidence. When grading exams, the student’s
identity is often known to the grader on minor exams but hidden on major ones, e.g., Ph.D.
comprehensives. In manuscript evaluations, Blank (1991) reports that among 38 well-known
journals in chemistry, biology, physics, mathematics, history, psychology, political science,
sociology, and anthropology, 11 used blind review, as did 16 of 38 major economics journals.4
Settings in which informed review is the norm include grant proposals and student recruit-
ment. And, there are, of course, numerous settings of subjective performance in which blind
review is simply not feasible such as evaluating ﬁgure skaters, gymnasts, actors, and tenure
cases.
Most extant studies on the eﬀects of blind versus informed review (summarized below)
1See Taber (2005) for a complete story. The Paris tasting is also the subject of the recent motion picture Bottle
Shock.
2See http://www.stereophile.com/features/141/index8.html.
3See http://www.consumersearch.com/www/family/shampoo-reviews.
4In a more recent survey of 553 journals across 18 disciplines, Bachand and Sawallis (2003) ﬁnd that 58%
employ blind review.
2have been experimental or empirical. While revealing important insights, many of these inves-
tigations have presented conﬂicting evidence, making it diﬃcult – in the absence of a coherent
theory – to draw general conclusions or make consistent policy recommendations. In this pa-
per, a simple game-theoretic model is studied that focuses on three common features of many
review processes: (1) the “applicant” can improve the quality of his “project” by expending
eﬀort; (2) evaluation is typically a noisy process in which the reviewer observes only an imper-
fect subjective signal of quality; and (3) knowing the identity of the applicant would provide
the reviewer with additional information about his ability to produce a high quality project.5
While the applicant cares only about getting his project accepted, the evaluator is a Bayesian
decision maker who weighs her payoﬀs from implementing the right or the wrong decision.6
The equilibrium of this model is examined under three regimes: commitment which is an
ideal benchmark setting where the quality signal is veriﬁable and the evaluator can credibly
commit to an acceptance criterion, informed review in which the evaluator observes the ap-
plicant’s ability and blind review in which the applicant’s ability is hidden. In all three cases
the reviewer follows a simple equilibrium strategy: accept the project if and only if the quality
signal is above a certain threshold or standard.
Under informed review, the evaluator – not surprisingly – applies weak standards to high-
ability applicants and tough standards to low-ability ones. In fact, these standards are too
weak and too tough when compared with the ideal review process. In a sense, the benchmark
process calls for a more “fair” standard across applicants, even though no direct preference
for fairness is assumed.
The reason the ideal review policy is ﬂatter than the one implemented under informed
review is that it is designed not only to select good projects but also to provide incentives
to produce them. Both weak and tough standards generate poor incentives, albeit for op-
posing reasons. The marginal return to eﬀort is low to an agent who is either very likely
to have his project accepted or very likely to have it rejected. The optimally designed ac-
ceptance policy thus creates better incentives for agents at both ends of the type distribu-
tion by raising the standards facing high-ability agents and lowering those facing low-ability
ones. This policy, however, is not time-consistent. Once the applicant has invested eﬀort in
the project and submitted it for evaluation, the reviewer would prefer to renege and apply a
steeper (informationally-eﬃcient) acceptance policy. Hence, if the quality signal observed by
5The model best ﬁts the evaluation of cultural output such as wine, art, and music, or the grading of so-
phisticated exams or papers. While it captures some aspects of the academic research review process, the ﬁt is
imperfect because scholarly manuscripts are usually reviewed by referees who only advise an editor possessing
the ultimate decision authority. Also, in disciplines such as economics where it is commonplace to post working
papers on the Internet, blind review is practically infeasible.
6The model can be altered to allow the applicant to care about project quality so long as their is some residual
incongruity between his payoﬀs and the evaluator’s.
3the evaluator is not veriﬁable (e.g., because it is subjective or impractical to quantify), then it
will not be possible for her to credibly implement the relatively ﬂat ideal acceptance criterion.
It may, however, be possible for her to commit to remain ignorant about applicant types and
apply a completely ﬂat standard; that is, to perform blind review.
Under blind review, the evaluator sets a uniform standard as if she were assessing an
applicant of average ability. This policy provides good incentives for applicants at both ends
of the type distribution, but blind review is also clearly suboptimal when compared with the
ideal policy. Speciﬁcally, blind review does not allow the evaluator to use any information
about applicant ability to mitigate noise in the review process.
Hence, both informed and blind review procedures are suboptimal, but for diﬀerent rea-
sons. On one hand, ex post project selection is better under informed review, and on the
other, ex ante incentives are often better under blind review. Thus, the evaluator’s preference
between review procedures will depend on the environment, especially the distribution of abil-
ity in the applicant pool. Speciﬁcally, when the distribution of applicants contains a large
proportion of high-ability agents, then assessing project quality is relatively less important
than providing incentives and the evaluator, therefore, prefers blind review. Conversely, when
the applicant pool is skewed toward low ability, then project selection is paramount and the
evaluator prefers informed review.
Although the theory predicts that blind review is likely to be chosen when the applicant
pool is skewed toward high ability agents, informed review is practiced in a wide variety of
institutional settings. One feature common in these settings but absent from the basic model
is that reviewers often compete to attract high-quality applications. To investigate the impact
of competition on the choice of review process, the model is extended to allow for two identical
evaluators who decide strategically whether to adopt blind or informed review. The main
ﬁnding in this context is that competition creates incentives for evaluators to adopt informed
review. This is because high ability applicants strictly prefer the more lenient standards they
face under informed review. Since these applicants are most likely to produce high-quality
projects, evaluators adopt informed review in order to attract them.
The model is also extended to a setting where the quality of the project is a continuous
(rather than a dichotomous) variable. The main ﬁndings are shown to be robust with respect
to this speciﬁcation and some additional insights regarding the role of measurement error are
obtained.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The relevant literature and its rela-
tion to this investigation are discussed in the next section. In Section 3, the basic model is
presented. Sections 4, 5, and 6 contain the analysis of the commitment benchmark, informed
review, and blind review settings respectively. The three settings are further investigated in
4the context of a parametric example in Section 7. Section 8 contains three generalizations
and extensions of the basic model. Concluding remarks appear in Section 9. Several technical
lemmas and the Proofs of all propositions are relegated to the appendix.
2 Related Literature
There is a large empirical and experimental literature on the impact of anonymity on the aca-
demic publication process, which is ably surveyed by Snodgrass (2006). In particular, papers
by Blank (1991) in economics, Horrobin (1982) in modern languages, Link (1998) in medicine,
Peters and Ceci (1982) in psychology, and Zuckerman and Merton (1971) in physics found
compelling evidence that informed review is likely to introduce status, gender, or geographical
bias in evaluation of scholarly manuscripts. In fact, several of these studies were initiated
in response to concerns raised by young and/or female scholars, and subsequently led some
journals such as the American Economic Review [Ashenfelter (1992)] and the journals of the
modern language association, to change their evaluation policy to blind review.
In the 1970s and 80s, the concern about gender-biased hiring caused most major U.S. sym-
phony orchestras to adopt some form of blind auditioning. Goldin and Rouse (2000) estimate
that the switch to blind auditions can explain 25 percent of the increase in female orchestra
musicians hired over the intervening years.
The theoretical literature on subjective performance evaluation is relatively small [e.g.,
Levin (2003) and MacLeod (2003)]7 and almost exclusively addresses contracting problems
within an agency setting. The current investigation contributes to this literature by consider-
ing a complementary setting in which transfers between the parties are not allowed and the
principal can remain ignorant of the agent’s ability in order to motivate him. In this sense, the
interplay between information and incentives at the heart of the analysis is reminiscent of the
potential beneﬁts of imperfect monitoring in an agency context. Most notably, Riordan (1990)
and Sappington (1986) argue that while facilitating a more eﬃcient quantity decision by the
buyer, closer monitoring of costs may undermine a producer’s incentives for cost-reduction,
due to the fear of being held up by the buyer. In the same spirit, but within a dynamic model,
Cremer (1995) shows that the principal may commit to an ex ante ineﬃcient monitoring tech-
nology to induce the agent to work harder in case of a negative productivity shock.
This paper also relates to the labor literature on statistical discrimination, recognizing the
(potential) tension between fairness and eﬃciency (or incentives). Papers by Norman (2003)
and Persico (2002) highlight the fact that it is not a forgone conclusion that a more fair treat-
ment of diﬀerent groups of individuals interferes with a socially eﬃcient allocation of re-
7See Prendergast (1999) for an overview of the earlier literature.
5sources. Depending on the elasticity of each group’s production function, insisting on a more
equal treatment of groups may also shift equilibrium production toward a more socially eﬃ-
cient level.
The paper most closely related to this one is Coate and Loury (1993), which builds on Arrow
(1973). Coate and Loury study a model in which two identiﬁable groups that are ex ante iden-
tical invest in human capital. Employers receive noisy subjective signals regarding investment
levels and decide who to hire. There are assumed to be multiple equilibria of the invest-
ment/evaluation game. Coate and Loury suppose that one group coordinates with employers
on an equilibrium with a modest standard and higher investment, while the other group gets
stuck in a Pareto inferior equilibrium with a high standard and low investment. In the setting
investigated here, by contrast, agent ability is drawn from a continuum and represents real ex
ante heterogeneity in productivity. Moreover, players are assumed to coordinate on the unique
Pareto superior equilibrium. Coate and Loury demonstrate that forcing employers to use the
same standard across groups can correct ineﬃcient coordination failure. The focus here is on
a very diﬀerent but complementary question – when is it in the best interest of an evaluator to
commit herself not to use fundamentally valuable information in the review process? Hence,
the potential beneﬁt of blind review in this context is not to break coordination failure but to
raise productivity at both ends of the ability spectrum by pooling incentives.
3 The Basic Model
There are two risk-neutral parties: an applicant (the agent) and an evaluator (the principal)
who play a three-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, the principal commits to a review policy, which
is either informed (she directly observes the agent’s type) or blind (she does not observe the
agent’s type).
In the second stage, the agent, who knows the review policy and knows his own type ,
exerts eﬀort p 2 0;1 to prepare a project for review by the principal. The ultimate quality of
the project is high (q  h) with probability p or low(q  l with probability 1 p.8 The agent’s
eﬀort cost is given by
Cp; 
p2
2
;
where  2 ;  <.9 Hence,  is a measure of the agent’s productivity and may represent
either his innate ability or his experience.
8The focus of this investigation is the tradeoﬀ between provision of incentives and the eﬃcient use of infor-
mation. Although there are a number of ways of capturing this tradeoﬀ, the model presented here is probably
the simplest. A version of the model with continuous quality is, however, analyzed in sub section 8:3
9The functional form assumed for eﬀort cost is analytically helpful but not critical for the qualitative nature
of the results presented below.
6In the ﬁnal stage of the game, the agent submits the project to the principal for evaluation.
The principal does not observe p or q directly, but receives a subjective (i.e., non-veriﬁable)
signal of quality,  2 ;. Based upon the outcome of this signal – and the agent’s type if
the review policy is informed – the principal decides whether to accept or reject the project.
The principal prefers to accept high-quality projects and to reject low-quality ones. In
particular, her exogenous payoﬀ from accepting a high-quality project is v > 0 and from
accepting a low-quality one is  ` < 0. Her payoﬀ from rejecting a low-quality project is
taken to be zero, which is sensible since she otherwise could get “something for nothing”
in a degenerate equilibrium where she always rejects and the agent never exerts eﬀort. The
principal’s cost from rejecting a high-quality project is also taken to be zero. This greatly
simpliﬁes the analysis and is reasonable in many settings. The more general case in which
she also suﬀers a loss from a false rejection is, however, analyzed in subsection 8:1. It is
notationally convenient to deﬁne the principal’s loss/beneﬁt ratio from accepting a project by
r 
`
v.
The agent prefers the project to be accepted regardless of its underlying quality. Speciﬁ-
cally, he receives an exogenous gross payoﬀ of u > 0 if the principal accepts the project and
zero if she rejects it. No monetary transfers between the parties are permitted.10
The agent’s type,  is distributed according to the distribution function G possessing
density g and ﬁnite mean . The signal, , is drawn from one of two distributions: Fh
(with density fh) if project quality is high or Fl (with density fl) if it is low. For
analytical convenience, assume fq is bounded and twice diﬀerentiable. The likelihood ratio
is deﬁned by R 
fh
fl , and satisﬁes the following regularity conditions.
Assumption 1 (Signal Technology). The Likelihood ratio satisﬁes:
(i) R0 > 0,
(ii) R  0 and R  1,
(iii) lim! R1   Fq  q exists for q 2 fl;hg and h > 0.
Part (i) is the familiar monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) indicating that higher
signals are associated with high project quality. Part (ii) says that the most extreme signals
(which occur with probability zero) are perfectly informative. This ensures equilibrium exis-
tence. Part (iii) is a boundary condition used below to identify the set of agent types that exert
zero eﬀort in equilibrium. Note that MLRP implies Fl  Fh and thus h  l  0. The
requirement h > 0 is necessary because all types of agent would otherwise exert zero eﬀort
under informed review.
10It seems natural in the evaluation environments alluded to in the Introduction to prohibit direct transfers.
Nevertheless, a brief remark on the possibility of transfers appears in Section 7.
7Example 1 (Signals). The following signal technology will be used repeatedly below in illustrative
examples. The principal’s subjective signal is drawn from one of the two triangular densities on
[0,1]: fh  2 or fl  21   . This implies R 

1  , h  2, and l  0 in
agreement with Assumption 1.
All aspects of the environment are common knowledge, and the solution concept is Pareto
eﬃcient Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). Hence, if multiple PBE exist and they are Pareto
rankable, then the principal and agent are assumed to coordinate on the Pareto-superior one.
4 The Commitment Benchmark
The fundamental problem facing the principal is her inability to commit. Because her evalua-
tion results in only a subjective non-veriﬁable assessment of quality, once she observes , the
principal will accept the project if an only if doing so will yield her a positive expected payoﬀ.
While this is obviously optimal ex post (after the agent has sunk eﬀort), it is not generally
desirable from an ex ante perspective. To highlight this problem, the benchmark case of the
principal’s optimal review policy under commitment is characterized in this section. It should
be understood that implementation of this policy requires both the signal  to be veriﬁable
and the principal to have the power to commit to abide by any review policy she announces.11
To begin the analysis, note that there is no scope for blind review in this context. With full
power of commitment, the principal can choose to ignore information whenever doing so is
advantageous to her. Hence, it may be assumed that the principal knows the agent’s type, ,
when executing the review policy. In general, a review policy is a function, ;, specifying
the probability that the principal accepts a type  agent’s project when the realized signal is
. A review policy is called a standard, and denoted by s, if it is a step function of the form
; 
(
0; if  < s
1; if   s.
In other words, the project is accepted if and only if the signal  achieves the standard s.
It can be shown, however, that MLRP implies that the principal always uses a standard when
evaluating the project, and hence, there is no loss in generality from restricting attention to
this class of review policies.
Given a standard s, a type  agent will choose p so as to maximize his expected payoﬀ
Up;s;  up1   Fhs  1   p1   Fls  
p2
2
; (1)
11Even if  is veriﬁable, commitment may be problematic; especially when the review policy calls for the prin-
cipal to reject a project she would rather accept. Nonetheless, in certain settings it is not completely unrealistic
for the principal to commit to an ex ante standard. For instance, a PhD advisor may lay out in front of other
committee members exactly what ﬁndings will constitute a viable thesis, or a supervisor may announce clear
goals that must be achieved in order for subordinates to be promoted.
8subject to the downward and upward feasibility restrictions, p  0 and p  1.
The ﬁrst term in (1) is the agent’s expected beneﬁt. It is his exogenous payoﬀ if the project
is accepted, u, times the probability of acceptance (i.e., the probability that quality is high and
the standard is met p1   Fhs plus the probability that quality is low and the standard is
met 1   p1   Fls). The second term in (1) is just the eﬀort cost Cp;.
The ﬁrst-order condition characterizing an interior maximum along with the upward feasi-
bility restriction can be combined to give the agent’s reaction function:
Ps;  minfuFls   Fhs; 1g: (2)
If the feasibility restriction does not bind, then the agent’s reaction function is “hump-
shaped.” To see this, note ﬁrst that the most extreme standards would elicit no eﬀort at all,
P;  P;  0. Next deﬁne s  R 11. Then
Pss;  u1   Rsfls
is positive for s < s (eﬀort is increasing in the standard) and negative for s > s (eﬀort
is decreasing in the standard). This makes sense. Low standards elicit little eﬀort because
projects are rarely rejected and high standards elicit little eﬀort because they are rarely ac-
cepted. The marginal return to eﬀort is zero at the extremes and highest when the agent faces
intermediate standards. Speciﬁcally, setting a standard of s would induce the agent to exert
maximal eﬀort regardless of his type. (See Figure 2 in Example 4 below.) If, however,  is
suﬃciently high, then the upward feasibility restriction will bind for some intermediate range
of standards; i.e., the “hump” of the reaction function will become a “plateau” truncated at a
height of Ps;  1.
Of course, inducing the agent to exert eﬀort is only part of the principal’s objective. In gen-
eral, an optimal review policy must both provide incentives and select high-quality projects as
often as possible. Speciﬁcally, the principal will commit herself to a standard that maximizes
her expected payoﬀ12
Vs;p  vp1   Fhs   `1   p1   Fls; (3)
subject to the agent’s reaction function (2).
The principal’s objective is straightforward. It is her exogenous beneﬁt from accepting
a good project, v, times the probability the project is good and the standard is achieved,
p1   Fhs, minus her exogenous loss from accepting a bad project, `, times the probability
the project is bad and the standard is achieved, 1   p1   Fls.
12In general there are two situations to consider. The principal might announce the review policy either before
or after observing the agent’s type. Because the expectation over  of Vs;Ps; is separable in , the optimal
review policy in either case, however, is found by maximizing this function with respect to s for each value of
 2 ;.
9Substituting the agent’s reaction function directly into (3) results in the function
Vs;Ps;  vPs;1   Fhs   `1   Ps;1   Fls: (4)
This function is continuous, and hence achieves a maximum on the compact interval ;.
The following assumption ensures suﬃciency of the ﬁrst-order condition.13
Assumption 2 (Single-Peaked Preferences). The function Vs;Ps; is strictly quasi-concave
in s whenever Ps; < 1.
Ignoring the feasibility restrictions for the moment and diﬀerentiating (4) with respect to s
yields the ﬁrst-order condition
Vss;Ps; | {z }
Selection Eﬀect
 Vps;Ps;Pss;
| {z }
Incentive Eﬀect
 0: (5)
Denote the solution to this equation by sC
0 . This is the optimal standard the principal
would announce for an agent whose type  fell in the range C
 ;C
 where the feasibility
restrictions do not bind.
Equation (5) identiﬁes the tradeoﬀ facing the principal, selection versus incentives. The
ﬁrst term in (5) represents the selection eﬀect:
Vss;Ps;   vPs;Rs   `1   Ps;fls:
As is shown in the next section, setting this term alone equal to zero results in the standard
that accepts projects if and only if they have positive expected value to the principal, i.e., if
and only if they are ex post optimal. On the other hand, the second term in (5) represents the
incentive eﬀect:
Vps;Ps;Pss;  v1   Fhs  `1   Flsu1   Rsfls:
As discussed above, setting this term alone equal to zero results in the standard, s  R 11,
that maximizes the agent’s eﬀort. In general, it is not possible to set both of these terms to
zero simultaneously. In other words, there is tension between the eﬃcient use of information
and motivating the agent.
13It is easy to verify that if Rs  1, Assumption 2 is automatically satisﬁed; and if Rs > 1, it is satisﬁed
whenever
 
Rs 
r 1
2 1   FlsR0s
Rs   1Rs  r
 fls < 0:
This inequality turns out not to be too stringent owing to the assumptions that fls is bounded, and
lims!Rs1   Fls exists:
10Deﬁne the endpoints of the interval C
 ;C
 by
C
  
r
u2h  r   1l
; (6)
and
C
  minf jPsC
0 ;  1g: (7)
The following result completely characterizes the benchmark solution.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium under Commitment).
Principal: Under commitment, the principal sets the standard
sC 
8
> <
> :
; if  < C
 
sC
0 ; if  2 C
 ;C

minfs jPs;  1g; if  > C

Moreover, sC is continuous, strictly decreasing for  > C
 , and lim!1 sC  .
Agent: Under commitment, the agent chooses eﬀort level
pC 
8
> <
> :
0; if  < C
 
PsC
0 ;; if  2 C
 ;C

1; if  > C
.
Moreover, pC is continuous, and strictly increasing for  2 C
 ;C
.
Several key insights emerge from Proposition 1. First, there is a negative relationship be-
tween an agent’s ability and the standard set for him. This is a consequence of the selection
eﬀect. Higher ability agents are more likely to produce good projects. Recognizing this, the
principal accordingly lowers the standard confronting them. It is shown in the next section,
however, that this response is attenuated by the commitment setting by the incentive eﬀect. In
order to elicit more eﬀort from the agent, the principal commits herself to a standard, sC,
that is “too ﬂat” to be ex post optimal. In other words, under sC, there is a chance that the
principal will be forced to reject the project of a high ability agent or accept the project of a
low ability one when she would prefer to do otherwise. This possibility is most starkly illus-
trated for ability levels   C
. For these high-ability types, the upward feasibility restriction
binds; i.e., these types exert full eﬀort (p  1). Nevertheless, the standard facing such an agent,
sC, is greater than the minimum standard, . Hence, even though the principal knows for
sure that the project is good, she commits herself to reject it with positive probability. Only
by doing so can she induce the agent to exert eﬀort in the ﬁrst place.
At the other end of the spectrum are the low ability agents with   C
 . These types of
agents are eﬀectively pre-screened in the sense that the principal commits never to accept their
11projects; i.e., sC  . Consequently, these types exert no eﬀort, so the downward feasibility
restriction binds (p  0). It is true that by lowering the standard facing these types of agents
the principal could induce positive eﬀort, but the expected gain arising from the improved
incentives would be outweighed by the possibility of having to accept a project that is likely to
be low-quality.
Finally, it is straightforward to verify that s 2 sCC
;.14 Hence, there exists a unique
critical type  such that sC  s. For this one type of agent, there is no conﬂict between
selection and incentives. In particular, the standard, s, set for type  both induces maximal
eﬀort and leads to an ex post optimal acceptance criterion. For all other types,   , how-
ever, the benchmark solution sC, strikes a balance between selecting good projects ex post
and providing incentives ex ante.
Example 2 (Commitment). Suppose the signal technology from Example 1 and that v  ` 
u  1. (An example with general parameter values is solved below in Section 7.) From (2), the
agent’s reaction function is
Ps;  minf2s1   s; 1g:
For  < 2, this is hump-shaped and attains a maximum at s 
1
2. From (3), the principal’s
payoﬀ is
Vs;p  p1   s2   1   p1   s2:
Substituting Ps; into this and maximizing gives the commitment solution
sC 
8
> > > <
> > > :
1; if  < C
 
1
3 
1
6; if  2 C
 ;C


1
2

1  
q
1  
2


; if  > C
,
where C
  
1
4 and C
  1
3
p
2
4 . As Proposition 1 indicates, sC is decreasing for  > C
 . Low
types with   C
 , are prescreened and induced to exert no eﬀort (P1;  0), while high types
with   C
 are induced to exert full eﬀort (PsC;  1). Note that for   C
, the principal
knows that the project is high-quality, but she sets a standard of sCC
  0:4142. This means
that she rejects the project with probability FhsCC
  0:1716. Finally, setting sC  s
and solving reveals that the critical type that exerts maximum eﬀort is   1.
5 Informed Review
If the principal is unable to credibly commit to a standard, then she cannot act as a Stackleberg
leader, maximizing her expected payoﬀ subject to the agent’s reaction function. Instead, after
14See the proof of Proposition 3.
12the agent has sunk eﬀort, p, in the project, the principal will decide what standard, s, to
apply. Because the principal cannot observe p when she selects s, the temporal ordering of
moves is actually immaterial. In other words, the eﬀort and standard are determined in a Nash
equilibrium of a simultaneous-move game.
If the principal has opted for informed review, then she observes the agent’s type when
choosing the standard. Hence, she maximizes her expected payoﬀ, Vs;p, given in (3) with
respect to s holding ﬁxed p. The ﬁrst-order condition is
Vss;Ps;   vpRs   `1   pfls  0: (8)
Rearranging this yields the principal’s reaction function
Sp  R 1
 
r
1   p
p
!
: (9)
Note that Assumption 1 implies: S0  , S1  , and S0p   
r
p2R0s < 0. This makes
sense: if the principal believes the project is certainly bad (p  0), then no signal realization
will convince her to accept it; i.e., she sets the maximum standard, . Similarly, if she believes
the project is certainly good p  1), then no signal realization will deter her from accepting
it; i.e., she sets the minimum standard, . In general, the higher the principal believes p to be,
the lower she sets the standard for acceptance.
(See Figure 2 in Example 4 below.) Observe also that (9) implies that the principal always
makes an ex post optimal acceptance decision. Speciﬁcally, the principal’s expected payoﬀ
from accepting the project when she observes signal  is
v
pfh
pfh  1   pfl
  `
1   pfl
pfh  1   pfl
:
MLRP implies that this expression is monotone increasing in . Moreover, it is easy to verify
that it is negative if  < Sp, zero if   Sp, and positive if  > Sp. Hence, the standard,
Sp, induces the principal to accept the project if and only if doing so has a positive expected
payoﬀ conditional on the observed signal.
Solving the agent and principal’s reaction functions (2) and (9) results in the equilibrium
standard and eﬀort under informed review, sI;pI. Observe that a degenerate Nash
equilibrium in which the principal never accepts the project (sI  ) and the agent never
exerts eﬀort (pI  0) always exists. Indeed, for values of  less than a cutoﬀ I
  (deﬁned
below), this is the unique equilibrium, in which case the agent is said to be prescreened. For
higher values of , however, non-degenerate Nash equilibria typically exist. In this case, the
following observation, which obtains directly from the Envelope Theorem, implies that the set
of equilibria are Pareto rankable.
Lemma 1. (i) The principal’s indirect payoﬀ, VSp;p is increasing in p.
13(ii) The agent’s indirect payoﬀ, UPs;;s;, is decreasing in s.
Because the principal’s reaction function is downward-sloping, equilibria with lower stan-
dards (which the agent prefers) involve higher eﬀort (which the principal prefers). Hence, when
multiple equilibria exist, the one with the lowest standard and highest eﬀort is Pareto superior,
and the players are presumed to coordinate on it.15
Momentarily ignoring the feasibility restrictions and substituting for p in (8) from (2) gives
Vss;Ps;   vPs;Rs   `1   Ps;fls  0 (10)
Deﬁne sI
0 to be the smallest root to this equation. Then sI
0 is the equilibrium standard
when the feasibility restrictions on p do not bind. Note that (10) says that the selection eﬀect
identiﬁed in (5) is set to zero under informed review; i.e., the equilibrium standard is ex post
optimal.
Deﬁne the cutoﬀ type by
I
  
r
uh   l
: (11)
The following result fully characterizes the equilibrium under informed review.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium under Informed Review).
Principal: Under informed review, the principal sets the standard
sI 
(
; if  < I
 
sI
0; if   I
 .
Moreover, sI is strictly decreasing for  > I
  , and lim!1 sI  .
Agent: Under informed review, the agent chooses eﬀort level
pI 
(
0; if  < I 
PsI
0;; if   I
 .
Moreover, pI is strictly increasing for  > I
 , and lim!1 pI  1.
Proposition 2 is intuitive. As in the benchmark setting, higher ability agents exert more ef-
fort in equilibrium and therefore face lower standards. Two diﬀerences from the commitment
case are, however, readily apparent. First, at the low end of the type space, the range over
which prescreening occurs is larger under informed review than under commitment (I
  > C
 ).
In other words, more types are induced to exert positive eﬀort under commitment. Second, at
the high end of the type space, the agent never exerts full eﬀort under informed review while
15The Pareto eﬃcient equilibrium does not, however, maximize social surplus (i.e., the sum of the player’s
expected payoﬀs). In general, the principal sets too high of a standard and the agent exerts too little eﬀort in
equilibrium because they do not account for the externalities their choices impose on the other player.
14all types greater than C
 do under commitment.16 Hence, at both extremes of the type space,
the agent exerts less eﬀort under informed review than under commitment. In fact, this holds
generally as is stated in the following key result. (See Figure 1 below.)
Proposition 3 (Commitment vs. Informed Review). The equilibrium proﬁle of standards is ‘ﬂat-
ter’ under commitment than under informed review and eﬀort is higher. Speciﬁcally, suppose
 > C
  (else sC  sI  ), then
sC
8
> <
> :
< sI; if  < 
 sI; if   
> sI; if  > ,
and pC  pI with strict inequality if   .
Proposition 3 is easily understood. The commitment standard, sC, strikes a balance
between the goals of project selection and incentive provision, while the informed-review stan-
dard, sI, puts weight only on project selection. For low types,  < , the incentive eﬀect
is negative; i.e., lowering the standard induces more eﬀort. Hence, commitment involves more
lenient standards than informed review for low-ability agents. On the other hand, for high
types,  > , the incentive eﬀect is positive; i.e., raising the standard induces more eﬀort.
Hence, commitment involves more stringent standards than informed review for high-ability
agents. For the one critical type,   , there is no conﬂict between selection and incentives,
and the standards are, therefore, identical under either regime, sC  sI  s.17 In
other words, under commitment, the principal implements a ﬂatter (and hence more equitable)
proﬁle of standards in order to generate better incentives for all types of agents. In this light,
it is not surprising that equilibrium eﬀort is uniformly higher under commitment than under
informed review.
Example 3 (Informed Review). Suppose the signal technology of Example 1 and that v  ` 
u  1. From (9), the principal’s reaction function is
Sp  1   p:
This gives the ex post optimal acceptance criterion. Solving it and the agent’s reaction function,
Ps;  minf2s1   s; 1g
yields the equilibrium standard under informed review,
sI 
(
1; if  < I
 
1
2; if   I
 ,
16Indeed, inducing full eﬀort by the agent requires commitment to a standard that is not ex post optimal
because the principal’s best response to p  1 is s   and the agent’s best response to s   is p  0.
17Recall that s  R 11 at which eﬀort is maximized.
15where I
  
1
2. Comparison with Example 2 reveals that the region of prescreening is larger
under informed review than under commitment
1
2 >
1
4. Notice also that no ﬁnite type ever
exerts full eﬀort under informed review. For  > I
 , the equilibrium proﬁle under informed
review, sI, is steeper than the one under commitment, sC, and imposes higher standards
for  < 1 and lower standards for  > 1. It is straightforward to check that eﬀort is uniformly
lower under informed review.
6 Blind Review
If, as is often the case, the principal observes only a subjective signal of project quality, then
she will not be able to commit to the relatively ﬂat proﬁle of standards sC. In this case, it
may, nevertheless, be possible for her to commit to remain ignorant of the agent’s type when
performing an evaluation. That is, she may be able to implement a policy of blind review and
impose the same completely ﬂat standard sB on all agent types. While blind review forces the
principal to disregard information that is valuable for project selection, it can be an eﬀective
method for providing incentives. For instance, Proposition 2 indicates that a blind review
procedure with sB  s would raise the eﬀort of all types relative to a policy of informed
review. Of course, even under blind review the principal can only implement a standard, sB,
that is ex post optimal given the information she possesses. The question is whether it is ever
advantageous for her to commit to possessing less information.
In order to explore the relative merits of blind review, it is analytically convenient to rule
out cases in which the upward feasibility restriction on eﬀort binds. Hence, the following
additional assumption is imposed below.18
Assumption 3 (Bounded Eﬀort). The highest ability agent never exerts full eﬀort,
uFls   Fhs < 1:
Because the principal does not observe , the equilibrium standard is a best response to
the agent’s expected eﬀort:
sB  R 1
 
r
1   EpB
EpB
!
: (12)
Similarly, in equilibrium the agent’s eﬀort is a best response to the standard,
pB  uFlsB   FhsB: (13)
Invoking Assumption 3 when taking the expectation of (13) over  gives
EpB  uFlsB   FhsB: (14)
18A stronger assumption, which is easier to check, is simply u  1.
16These three equations deﬁne the equilibrium standard and eﬀort under blind review. In par-
ticular, comparing the solution to (12), (13) and (14) to the solution to (2) and (9) yields the
following characterization.
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium under Blind Review).
Principal: Under blind review, the principal sets the standard equal to the one she would have
set for the mean type of agent under informed review, sB  sI.
Agent: Under blind review, the agent chooses eﬀort level pB  PsI;.
While this result follows from the fact that the agent’s reaction function Ps; is linear in
, it has intuitive appeal. In particular, it seems reasonable that, when ignorant of the agent’s
type, the principal sets the standard as if she faced the average type,  in the population
under informed review (see Figure 1.). An implication of Proposition 4 is that the standard
adopted under blind review and the eﬀort it induces is sensitive to the distribution of types.
For instance, if the mean type of agent is less than the prescreening cutoﬀ,   I
 , then
Proposition 4 indicates that blind review results in the degenerate equilibrium in which no
project is ever accepted, sB  , and no type of agent exerts eﬀort, pB  0. If GI
  < 1,
then informed review clearly dominates blind review in this case because it induces positive
eﬀort by some high types. The following result provides a comparison between the standards
and induced eﬀort under informed and blind review.
Figure 1: Equilibrium Standards
Proposition 5 (Comparing Outcomes).
17(i) Agents with less than average ability face a lower standard under blind review than under
informed review and agents with greater than average ability face a higher standard:
sB
(
< sI; if  <  and  > I
 
> sI; if  > .
(ii) Expected eﬀort is higher under blind review than under informed review if the mean type is
suﬃciently close to the critical type; i.e., there exists  > 0 such that
      <  ) EpB > EpI:
Part (i) of Proposition 5 is a direct consequence of Propositions 2 and 4. Because the proﬁle
of standards under informed review is decreasing and because blind review is equivalent to
an informed review over the mean type, the principal applies a tougher standard under blind
review to types above the mean and a weaker standard to types below the mean. Combining
this with the fact that agents always like lower standards (part (ii) of Lemma 1) reveals that
an agent whose ability is above the mean prefers informed review while one whose ability
is below the mean prefers blind review. In other words, a high-ability agent would like to
reveal his identity to the evaluator and a low-ability one would like to remain anonymous.
This observation raises an interesting policy question: why not simply let agents self-select
the mode of review when they apply? The answer is that such a policy would lead all agents
including the low-ability types to opt for informed review; because once the highest types
select informed review, the highest remaining types in the applicant pool will do likewise,
until unravelling causes the pool of agents preferring blind review to vanish.1920
Part (ii) of Proposition 5 is also easily grasped. In the event   , the standard under
blind review is the one that maximizes the eﬀort of all types, sB  s. Clearly, no other review
policy will elicit higher average eﬀort than blind review in this case. Suppose, however, that
 is slightly greater than  (the discussion is analogous for  < s). Then sB  sI will
be less than s. For types  > , blind review still imposes a higher standard than informed
review, so these types would continue to exert more eﬀort under blind review. Types in the
interval ;, however, would exert more eﬀort under informed review because it calls for
a higher standard, sI 2 sB;s. Of course, sB is also too low for a neighborhood of types
less than . However, there is a type 0 <  for whom the excessively low standard sB < s
would elicit the same eﬀort as the excessively high one sI0 > s. For all types  < 0, blind
19Such equilibrium unravelling is similar in spirit to the one that generates the full disclosure of product
quality by a monopolist. See, e.g., Milgrom (1981).
20It is interesting in this context to note that the proponents of blind review in the cases of journals and
symphony orchestras did not advocate a system of self-selection (see, Blank (1991), and Goldin and Rouse
(2000)). Only a small number of psychology journals appear to oﬀer this choice to authors.
18review would induce strictly higher eﬀort. In other words, if   , then there is a band of
types around  who would exert more eﬀort under informed review while the extreme types
outside this band would exert more eﬀort under blind review. When  is distant from  (e.g.,
  I
 ), then the band of types who would work harder under informed review is large, and it
is the superior evaluation procedure.
It is worth remarking on the reason blind review provides better incentives than informed
review when  is close to . Agents work harder under blind review in this case because
of a peer eﬀect deriving from an evaluation externality. Under informed review, high-ability
agents rest on their lorals, knowing that the principal will give them the beneﬁt of the doubt.
Low-ability agents also exert little eﬀort under informed review, but for the opposite reason –
they are aware that the principal will discriminate against them. Blind review pools high and
low ability agents together and improves incentives at both ends of the spectrum. It is credible
for the principal to apply a tougher standard to high ability agents if she cannot distinguish
them from the low-ability ones. By the same token, it is credible for her to apply a relatively
soft standard to low-ability agents when she cannot diﬀerentiate them from high-ability ones.
This points to the value of having a diverse applicant pool. When blind review is conducted
on a group containing both low ( < ) and high ( > ) ability agents, the resulting peer
eﬀect raises the productivity at both ends of the distribution. In this sense, blind review may
not only be more fair than informed review, but more eﬃcient as well.
When choosing the review policy at the beginning of the game, the principal’s objective is
not only to raise eﬀort but also to make a correct acceptance decision. Deﬁne the principal’s
equilibrium payoﬀ under informed review by VI  VsI;pI. By proposition 4 the
principal’s expected equilibrium payoﬀ under blind review is
EVB  vEpB1   FhsB   `1   EpB1   FlsB
 vpI1   FhsI   `1   pI1   FlsI  VI:
Hence, when choosing between review policies, the principal compares her expected payoﬀ un-
der informed review, EVI, with her expected payoﬀ under blind review, VI. Evidently,
if VI is convex or concave everywhere, then Jensen’s inequality will suﬃce to rank the two
payoﬀs irrespective of the type distribution. In general, however, VI is S-shaped, possessing
both a convex and a concave region, as the following lemma records.
Lemma 2. If I
  is suﬃciently low, then there exist two points, L  H, such that VI is strictly
convex for  < L and strictly concave for  > H.
The intuition behind Lemma 2 is that for very high types, eﬀort is close to its maximum, and
so is the principal’s payoﬀ. Thus, there are diminishing marginal returns to ability. For very
19low types, on the other hand, a rise in ability not only raises eﬀort but signiﬁcantly improves
the probability of making a correct acceptance decision.
In light of Lemma 2, it is clear that the principal’s choice between the two review procedures
depends crucially on the distribution of types. If, for instance, all types receiving positive
probability density under g are above H (where VI is concave), then Jensen’s inequality
implies that blind review dominates informed review. On the other hand, if g puts weight
only on types less than L (where VI is convex), then the principal prefers Informed Review.
In general, which review procedure is optimal depends on whether high types or low types are
more prevalent in the population, as is noted in the following key result.
Proposition 6 (Blind vs. Informed Review). Suppose that the support of the ability distribution
includes a (low) region where VI is convex and a (high) region where it is concave; i.e.,  <
L  H < . Then, the principal prefers blind [resp. informed] review if
(i) the ability distribution is suﬃciently skewed toward high [resp. low] types, and/or
(ii) the payoﬀ from acceptance for the agent, u, is suﬃciently large [resp. small].
Part (i) of Proposition 6 indicates that incentives are more important than project selection
when evaluating high-ability agents. It is relatively cheap for these agents to exert eﬀort,
and blind review motivates them to do so. Project selection, however, becomes the dominant
concern when evaluating low-ability agents, and informed review is, therefore, preferable in
this case.
The second part of Proposition 6 states that, ﬁxing the type distribution, the principal is
also more likely to prefer blind review, as the agent’s payoﬀ from acceptance, u, increases.
Note from (2) that an increase in u is equivalent to an increase in . Hence, agents with high
rewards from acceptance will behave like those with high ability, in which case blind review
is the principal’s preferred mode of evaluation. This ﬁnding is consistent with the example
mentioned in the Introduction that a student’s identity is often revealed to the grader in minor
exams, but not on major ones such as PhD qualifying exams.
Example 4 (Blind Review). Suppose the signal technology of Example 1 and that v  `  u  1.
Suppose also that there are only two possible types,  2 f
1
2;
3
2g, that are equally likely. Hence,
the expected value of  is   1, which (as noted in Example 2) is also the critical type . The
table below displays the equilibrium standards, eﬀorts and error probabilities under informed
and blind review, and the solution is depicted in Figure 2
Because   , the ﬂat standard under blind review induces higher eﬀort from both types
of agent. Indeed, as noted in Example 3, I
  
1
2, so the low-ability agent is prescreened under
informed review and therefore exerts no eﬀort at all. Although blind review provides better
20informed blind
standard:  
1
2 1
1
2
standard:  
3
2
1
3
1
2
effort:  
1
2 0
1
4
effort:  
3
2
2
3
3
4
Prfacceptjq  0g
1
9
1
4
Prfrejectjq  1g
1
9
1
4
Figure 2: Solutions for Informed and Blind Review
incentives, this comes at a cost. The probability of making a mistake (either accepting a bad
project or rejecting a good one) is substantially higher under blind review. From Example 3 it is
straightforward to compute
VI 

1  
1
2
2
:
This is S-shaped with an inﬂection point at H  L 
3
4. The principal’s expected equilibrium
payoﬀs under informed and blind review are respectively: EVI 
2
9 and VI 
1
4. Hence,
blind review is the preferred mode of evaluation in this case.
7 A Fully Parametric Example
In this section an example is solved for general values of r 
`
v and u, and comparative statics
with respect to these parameters are investigated. Hence, suppose the signal technology from
Example 1. Also, suppose the agent’s ability is distributed uniformly on ;.
7.1 Commitment
The commitment solution is
sC 
8
> > > <
> > > :
1 if  < C
  p
1710r9r216r1 r=u 5r 1
81 r if  2 C
 ;C

1 
q
1 
2
u
2 if  > C
,
21where C
  
r
4u and
C
 
13  20r   r2  5  r
p
17  14r  r2
16u1  r
:
Notice that the evaluator optimally prescreens agents with suﬃciently low types, i.e.,  
r
4u.
Prescreening naturally becomes more prevalent as her loss-to-beneﬁt ratio, r, from accepting
projects rises. Prescreening, however, becomes less endemic as the agent’s payoﬀ from accep-
tance increases, because all types work harder when u rises. Note also that for agents whose
projects are evaluated, the optimal standard, sC increases in r, and decreases in  and u,
which is intuitive. It is somewhat more surprising that as r increases, more agents are induced
to exert full eﬀort; i.e., C
 decreases. In fact, if r > 8:05, then C
 < C
 . In this case, the agent
is either induced to exert no eﬀort (if  < C
) or full eﬀort (if   C
).
7.2 Informed and Blind Review
The equilibrium standard under informed review is,
sI 
8
<
:
1; if  <
r
2u p
r22r1 r=u r
21 r ; if  
r
2u
The comparative statics and prescreening properties of the informed-review standard are
qualitatively similar to the commitment case. However, informed review leads to more pre-
screening by also excluding the types between
r
4u and
r
2u. Moreover, the informed-review
standard is higher than the commitment standard for  <  
2r
1ru, and lower otherwise.
In this setting, Assumption 3 is  <
2
u. This ensures that the highest type does not exert
full eﬀort under blind review. With this in hand, the standard under blind review is sB  sI.
The principal’s expected equilibrium payoﬀ under informed review is VI  VsI;PsI;.
Clearly, VI  0 for  <
r
2u, because these low types are prescreened. Moreover, it is easy to
verify that VI is strictly convex for  2 
r
2u;L and strictly concave for  2 H;
2
u, where
L  H 
3r
21ru.
7.3 The Principal’s Review Preference
For ease of exposition, set  
r
2u to eliminate prescreening, because the same eﬀect from
including prescreened types can be captured by a lower . It follows that the principal strictly
prefers blind review, i.e., VI > EVI if and only if  > b r;u, where b r;u > H,
and b r;u is strictly increasing in r and strictly decreasing in u. In other words, blind review
becomes more attractive as the principals loss/beneﬁt ratio decreases and the agents payoﬀ
from acceptance increases. Moreover, the condition, b r;b > H for blind review to dominate
highlights the need for a suﬃcient mass of high types above the inﬂection point. For instance,
if r  u  1, then b   1:09435 and H  0:75:
22Remark 1. If, in this example, one posed the more general question of what the best
hybrid information structure is, then the answer would be for the principal to optimally adopt
informed review for  2 
r
2u;1 and blind review for  2 1;, where 1 maximizes the
principal’s expected payoﬀ. For a general treatment of optimal hybrid review policies, see
Taylor and Yildirim (2006).
Remark 2. In some evaluation settings, applicants may receive direct compensation con-
ditional on the acceptance of their projects. Although a full analysis of a setting involving
transferable utility is beyond the scope of this paper, some insight can be gleaned by extend-
ing Example 1. Consider the informed review setting, but now suppose the principal solicits
a type  agent to submit his project and commits to paying him, w  0 if accepted. For a
given w, this implies the following change of payoﬀs at the evaluation stage: u0 : u  w,
`0 : `  w and v0 : v   w, which in turn implies r0 :
`w
v w. Hence, a direct payment in-
creases the loss/beneﬁt ratio, and raises the standard for all . Note that if payoﬀs were purely
transfers, i.e., `  u  0, then clearly the optimal w, denoted w would be strictly positive
for all  to induce any eﬀort. The same would still be true, if the agent enjoyed an intrinsic
beneﬁt, but the principal incurred no loss from accepting a bad project, i.e, `  0 and u > 0.
If, on the contrary, ` > 0, and u  0, then it is easy to verify that w > 0 for a suﬃciently
small ` and w  0 for a suﬃciently large `. Finally, if ` > 0 and u > 0, speciﬁcally if
`  u  v  1, one ﬁnds that w > 0 if  2 1;1:5 and w  0 if   1;1:5. Over-
all, it seems that direct compensation to the agent is less likely to occur when the principal’s
loss/beneﬁt ratio becomes larger, but not when the agent has an intrinsic beneﬁt.
8 Generalizations and Extensions
In this section, the basic model is extended in three dimensions to highlight the robustness of
the results obtained above and glean some important additional insights.
8.1 Two Types of Error
Up to now, it has been assumed that the evaluator suﬀers a loss only from a false acceptance.
In some settings, however, she may also suﬀer a loss from a false rejection. For instance, mis-
judging a potentially good musician is probably as costly for the performance of a symphony
orchestra as hiring a potentially bad one. In Taylor and Yildirim (2006), it is shown that ac-
counting for both types of error does not qualitatively change the main results derived from
the basic model, especially those pertaining to the comparison of informed and blind review.
Thus, in this subsection only the new insights regarding the evaluator’s equilibrium payoﬀ and
the optimal level of prescreening are highlighted.
23Suppose, in addition to the loss,  ` < 0 from a false acceptance, the principal also incurs
a loss,  ` < 0 from a false rejection. While this generalization does not alter the agent’s
payoﬀ in (1), the expected loss from rejecting a good project needs to be subtracted from the
principal’s payoﬀ in (3):
Vs;p  vp1   Fhs   `1   p1   Fls   `pFhs: (15)
Maximizing (15) with respect to s, the principal’s reaction function is
Sp  R 1r
1   p
p
; (16)
where r 
`
v`, is the modiﬁed loss/beneﬁt ratio from accepting a project.21 Since R0 > 0, (16)
implies that the principal is more likely to accept a project as her loss from a false rejection
increases. Applying the Envelope Theorem, the principal’s indirect payoﬀ satisﬁes
d
dp
VSp;p  v1   FhSp  `1   FlSp   `FhSp;
which is clearly positive if Sp is close to  and negative if Sp is close to . Hence, in
contrast to part (i) of Lemma 1, the principal’s indirect payoﬀ does not monotonically increase
in p. In fact, since S0   and s0p < 0, her indirect payoﬀ strictly decreases in p whenever
p is small, because such a project is very likely to be rejected and thus very likely to expose the
principal to a false rejection. More interestingly, a suﬃciently small p may result in a negative
payoﬀ for the evaluator, VSp;p < 0, which never occurs in the basic model with `  0.
The evaluator would, of course, avoid a negative payoﬀ if she could commit to prescreening
those agents who are unlikely to exert a high enough eﬀort. Intuitively, in the absence of
commitment, knowing the evaluator’s fear of a false rejection, some low ability agents who
are unlikely to produce a good project will submit their projects, and the evaluator will review
them to minimize the chances of a false rejection.
The discussion thus far reveals two potential observations caused purely by a costly false
rejection: First, the evaluator may receive a negative equilibrium payoﬀ from some interme-
diate type agents, and second equilibrium prescreening may be too little compared to the
commitment benchmark. Before formally conﬁrming these observations, notice that the non-
monotonicity of the evaluator’s indirect payoﬀ implies that unlike in the basic model, equilibria
under informed review are not always Pareto rankable. For consistency, however, continue to
assume that players coordinate on the equilibrium with the highest eﬀort and lowest standard.
Proposition 7 (Two Types of Error). Suppose both types of error are costly to the evaluator, i.e.,
`;` > 0. Then, in equilibrium
21By accepting a project, the principal may not only receive v but also avoid  `, explaining v  ` in r.
24(i) under informed review there exist two types, 
I
  < 
I
r such that
V
8
> > > <
> > > :
 0 if   
I
  or   
I
r
< 0 if 
I
  <  < 
I
r
> 0 if  > 
I
r;
(ii) if ` is suﬃciently large, then compared with commitment, there is less prescreening under
informed review, namely, 
I
  < 
C
 .
Hence, when the evaluator is suﬃciently concerned about a false rejection, there may be
too little prescreening under informed review as opposed to too much prescreening as seen
in the basic model. The reason is as suggested above: when the evaluator fears rejecting a
good project, she cannot credibly discourage some intermediate type agents from submitting
projects in equilibrium, even though they are unlikely to produce a high-quality project.22
Example 5 (Two Types of Error). Suppose the signal technology of Example 1 and that v 
`  `  u  1. From (16), the principal’s reaction function is Sp 
1 p
1p whereas the agent’s
reaction function remains as in Examples 2, 3 and 4, Ps;  Ps;  minf2s1   s; 1g.
The equilibrium standard under informed review is then given by
sI 
8
<
:
1; if  < 
I
  q
1
4 
1
2  
1
2; if   
I
 
where 
I
  
1
4. Compared with Example 3 where `  0, the evaluator prescreens fewer types
when she is also concerned about a false rejection. Simple algebra shows the evaluator’s
informed payoﬀ is V
I
  6  1
q
1 
2
   1   5 for  
1
4 so that V
I
 < 0 if and only
if  2 
1
4;
2
3. For instance, in equilibrium the agent of type  
1
2 exerts eﬀort, pI ' 0:236
in anticipation of the standard, sI ' 0:618, yielding V
I
 '  0:056. If the evaluator did
not review this project, then her payoﬀ would be  `pI   0:236. Under commitment, it
is straightforward to compute that the evaluator prescreens types  < 
C
  ' 0:667. Hence,
in contrast to Example 3, the region of prescreening is larger under commitment than under
informed review. For the cutoﬀ type,   
C
 , it is interesting to note that sC
C
  ' 0:499 and
pC
C
  > 0:332. That is, unlike Example 2, the commitment standard is discontinuous at the
cutoﬀ type, 
C
  because, to avoid a false rejection, the principal deals with only those types
who are able to exert high enough eﬀort. Finally, V
I
 is still S-shaped with an inﬂection point
at L  H 
3
4.
22Of course, if the evaluator could set a submission fee, she would improve her commitment power to exclude
the types that yield her a negative expected payoﬀ. See Taylor and Yildirim (2006) for details.
258.2 Competing Evaluators and Informed Review Bias
In practice there are often multiple evaluators, e.g., schools, companies, and academic journals,
that compete for (high-quality) applications. In this subsection, the basic model is extended to
show how competition among evaluators impacts the equilibrium mode of review.
Suppose there are two ex ante symmetric evaluators, i  1;2, who simultaneously and
publicly announce their review policies, i 2 fI;Bg. Upon observing 1 and 2, each agent
then exerts eﬀort and applies to one evaluator. To parameterize the degree of competition,
one of three possible situations is assumed to obtain. With probability 1    an agent is
unattached (i.e., he is free to apply to either evaluator); with probability

2 he is attached to
evaluator 1; and with probability

2 he is attached to evaluator 2. Attachments are independent
across agents and over types. For simplicity, also assume that re-applications are not feasible
and in case of indiﬀerence, an unattached agent selects between the evaluators with equal
probability.
Let 
1;2
i be evaluator i’s expected payoﬀ in the subgame with review policies, 1 and
2. Note that if 1  2  I, then ex ante each agent is equally likely to apply to either
evaluator, resulting in equal payoﬀs, 
I;I
i 
1
2EVI. If, on the other hand, 1  2  B,
then a straightforward argument shows that in equilibrium, both evaluators adopt the same
standard tailored to the population mean, , yielding equal payoﬀs, 
B;B
i 
1
2VI. The
equilibrium characterization with diﬀerent review policies is the least obvious.
Suppose, without loss of generality, 1  B and 2  I. Moreover, suppose, in equilibrium,
the mean type that applies to evaluator 1 is m1. This implies that an unattached type  prefers
evaluator 1 whenever  < m1. Hence, the conditional mean ability for evaluator 1 is
M1m1; 
1  

2 
R m1
 dG 

2
R 
m1 dG
1  

2 Gm1 

2 1   Gm1
:
In equilibrium, the conditional mean, m1  1 has to solve
M1m1;   m1  0: (17)
Lemma 3. There exists a unique solution, 1 to (17). The function 1 is strictly increasing
and has boundary values, 10   and 11  .
Lemma 3 is rather intuitive. It says that as each agent becomes less likely to be attached,
fewer high types choose blind review, which raises its standard and further discourages ap-
plications by high unattached types in the remaining pool. In particular, in the absence of
attached types, namely when   0, a complete unravelling of unattached types occurs in that
they all apply to evaluator 2 who performs an informed review.
26In light of Lemma 3, equilibrium payoﬀs for evaluators 1 and 2 in the subgame with 1  B
and 2  I are given respectively by

B;I
1   1  

2
G1 

2
1   G1VI1
and

B;I
2  

2
Z 1

VIdG  1  

2

Z 
1
VIdG:
The following lemma characterizes these payoﬀs.
Lemma 4. In the unique equilibrium with 1  B and 2  I, the evaluators’ payoﬀs have these
properties:
 
B;I
1  is strictly increasing, and 
B;I
1 0  0 and 
B;I
1 1 
1
2VI .
 
B;I
2  is strictly decreasing, and 
B;I
2 0  EVI and 
B;I
2 1 
1
2EVI.
In other words, the evaluator using blind review is better oﬀ when there are more attached
types, because they have a direct positive eﬀect on her payoﬀ as well as a positive indirect
eﬀect through attracting high unattached types who, by Lemma 3, anticipate a lower standard.
By the same token, the evaluator using informed review is worse oﬀ when there are more
attached types.
Having characterized the evaluators’ payoﬀs in each subgame, the equilibrium review poli-
cies can now be determined.
Proposition 8 (Equilibrium with Competing Evaluators). Suppose
1
2VI < EVI < VI.
Then, there exist two cutpoints, 0 <    < 1, such that for  < , the unique equilibrium
has 1  2  I whereas for  > , the unique equilibrium has 1  2  B. For  2
;, both symmetric and asymmetric review policies may occur in equilibrium.
The message of Proposition 8 is that competition between evaluators to attract high quality
applications is likely to lead evaluators to adopt informed review, even when each would indi-
vidually prefer blind review, i.e., EVI < VI, and such competition is more pronounced
as potential applicants lack strong preferences for evaluators, i.e., when  is small. Said dif-
ferently, blind review is likely to be prevalent in settings with little or no reviewer competition.
This ﬁnding is consistent with the anecdotal evidence that, unlike ﬁeld journals targeting a
speciﬁc audience, general-interest journals across various disciplines disproportionately uti-
lize informed review.
Example 6 (Competing Evaluators). Suppose the signal technology of Example 1 and that v 
`  u  1 and `  0. Suppose also that the agent’s ability is uniformly distributed on
270:5;2, so   1:25. From Example 4, VI 

1  
1
2
2
, which implies VI  0:36 and
EVI ' 0:326. Hence, if there were a single evaluator, she would opt for blind review. With
two evaluators, one calculates 1 
2 53
p
1 1 2
41  , and the cutpoints  ' 0:810 and
 ' 0:812. Applying Proposition 8, 1  2  I is the unique equilibrium for  < 0:810 and
1  2  B is the unique equilibrium for  > 0:812. For  2 0:810;0:812, there are exactly
two equilibria: 1  2  I and 1  2  B. Finally, for the knife-edge values   0:810 or
  0:812, asymmetric review policies are also sustained as equilibria.
8.3 Continuous Quality
In the basic model, the agent submits a project that is one of two possible qualities, high or
low. In many settings, however, quality is continuous rather than dichotomous. To verify ro-
bustness and generality of the results, a continuous-quality version of the model is explored in
this subsection. While the analysis reveals several new insights, the fundamental conclusions
from the dichotomous-quality setting are shown to translate naturally. Suppose that the agent
can select any eﬀort level x  0 at cost Cx; 
x2
2. As before, he receives an exogenous ben-
eﬁt of u if the project is accepted and zero if it is rejected. If the principal accepts the project,
then she receives a payoﬀ of q  x  y, where y is the outcome of a random productivity
shock that is Normally distributed with zero mean and variance 2
y. If the principal rejects the
project, then she receives a payoﬀ of v0 > 0 from an outside option.23 Hence, the principal
prefers to accept the project if q  v0 and to reject it if q < v0.
When presented with the project, the principal observes   q  z, where z is Normally
distributed measurement error with zero mean and variance 2
z.24 Deﬁne   y  z and note
that  is Normally distributed with zero mean and variance 2
  2
y  2
z. Denote the Normal
CDF and PDF for random variable j respectively by Fj and fj, for j 2 fy;z;g.
If the principal employs a standard s, then she rejects the project if  < s (i.e., if xyz <
s), which occurs with probability Fs   x. In particular, the principal’s expected payoﬀ from
employing a standard s when the agent exerts eﬀort x is
Vs;x  Fs   xv0  1   Fs   xx 
Z 1
1
y
 
1   Fzs   x   y

fyydy: (18)
Similarly, a type  agent’s expected payoﬀ from exerting eﬀort x when the principal imposes
a standard s is
Ux;s;  u1   Fs   x  
x2
2
: (19)
23It is necessary to assume v0 > 0 in order to avoid (uninteresting) corner solutions in which low-ability agents
exert zero eﬀort.
24Note that if there were no measurement error (i.e., 2
z  0), then the principal would observe quality directly,
and observing the agents type would be of no value to her.
28The agent’s reaction function is found by diﬀerentiating (19) with respect to x and is de-
ﬁned implicitly by
Xs;  ufs   Xs; (20)
As in the dichotomous-quality setting, the agent’s reaction function is hump-shaped. Low
standards elicit little eﬀort because projects are rarely rejected and high standards elicit little
eﬀort because they are rarely accepted. Unlike the two-quality version of the model, however,
the standard that maximizes eﬀort does depend on the agents type. It occurs along the 45-
degree line in s  x-space where s  uf0. Hence, in order to induce maximal eﬀort, higher
ability agents should face higher standards.
The following result characterizes the equilibrium standards and eﬀort levels for the com-
mitment, informed-review, and blind-review regimes.
Proposition 9 (Equilibrium with Continuous Quality).
(i) The equilibrium standard and eﬀort under commitment, sC;xC, are found by solv-
ing (20) and:
SCx  v0
 
2
Y  2
z
2
y
!
  x
 
2
z
2
y
!


x   SCx

1   FSCx   x

2
y
: (21)
(ii) The equilibrium standard and eﬀort under informed review, sI;xI, are found by
solving (20) and:
SIx  v0
 
2
Y  2
z
2
y
!
  x
 
2
z
2
y
!
: (22)
(iii) The equilibrium standard and eﬀort under blind review, sB;xB, are found by solving
(20) and:
SBx  v0
 
2
Y  2
z
2
y
!
  ˆ x
 
2
z
2
y
!
(23)
and
ˆ x 
R 
 xBfsB   xBgd
R 
 fsB   xBgd
: (24)
To obtain intuition for Proposition 9, ﬁrst consider the principals reaction function under
informed review (22). This is linear and decreasing in x. In other words – just as in the
dichotomous-quality version of the model – the principal employs a lower standard when
she anticipates higher eﬀort by the agent. Because the agent’s reaction function Xs; is
increasing in ability, it is easy to see that under informed review the equilibrium eﬀort, xI,
is increasing and the equilibrium standard, sI, is decreasing in . Hence, high ability agents
29face lower standards in equilibrium, but nevertheless, do exert more eﬀort than low ability
ones.
Consider the type  
v0
uf0. Under informed review, (20) and (22) indicate that this
critical type of agent faces the standard sI  v0 and exerts eﬀort xI  v0. Moreover,
no other standard would elicit higher eﬀort from this type of agent; i.e., the principals reaction
function intersects the critical type of agent’s reaction function at its peak. For types  > ,
the intersection occurs to the left of the peak and for types  < , it occurs to the right.
(See Figure 3.) In other words, the standards facing high ability agents are too low and the
standards facing low ability agents are too high to induce maximal eﬀort.
Next consider the equilibrium eﬀort, xB, and standard, sB, implemented under blind
review as deﬁned by (20), (23) and (24). Comparing (22) with (23), it is easy to see that the
standard adopted under blind review equals the one that would be employed against some
intermediate type of agent
ˆ  
ˆ x
uf2
y  2
zv0   ˆ x=2
y
:
Unlike in the dichotomous-quality setting, this intermediate type, ˆ  need not be the mean type,
.
Suppose – for the sake of discussion – that the distribution of types is such that ˆ   .
Then sB  v0 and all types (other than ) exert strictly higher eﬀort under blind review than
under informed review. (more generally, if ˆ   , then there is a band of types around  that
exert lower eﬀort under blind review while the types below and above this band exert higher
eﬀort, just as in the dichotomous-quality setting.) This is easily understood. First consider
types  > . As discussed above, eﬀort maximization requires using standards greater than
v0 against these high-ability agents. Such standards are not, however, credible when the signal,
, observed by the principal is subjective. In fact, under informed review the principal employs
standards less than v0 against these agents in equilibrium. Thus, adopting blind review and
implementing a standard of sB  v0 would raise the eﬀort of high-ability agents. For types
 < , eﬀort maximization requires using standards less than v0. Informed review, however,
implements standards higher than v0 against these low-ability agents. Hence, adopting blind
review and a standard of sB  v0 would also raise the eﬀort of low-ability agents.
Of course, neither informed review nor blind review is optimal. As in the dichotomous qual-
ity setting, informed review uses information eﬃciently ex post but provides poor incentives
ex ante, while blind review often provides better incentives but sacriﬁces valuable information.
To see this, consider the eﬀort, xC, and the standard, sC, implemented under the com-
mitment benchmark as deﬁned in (20) and (21). In particular, observe that (21) diﬀers from
(22) only by inclusion of the incentive term x   s1   Fs   x=2
y. In other words, the
30commitment standard diﬀers from the informed-review standard in order to provide better
incentives.
If   , then the incentive term in (21) vanishes and commitment and informed review
yield the same eﬀort and standard, namely x  s  v0. This makes sense,  is the type whose
eﬀort is maximized under informed review, so that there is no conﬂict between provision of
incentives and eﬃcient use of information for this type. For  < , it is easy to check that
the incentive term is negative (xC < v0 < sC). This implies directly that the standards
facing low-ability agents are lower (more lenient) under commitment than under informed
review. Similarly, for  > , the incentive term is positive (xC > v0 > sC, so that
the standards facing high-ability agents are higher (more stringent) under commitment than
under informed review. The reasoning is similar to that of the dichotomous-quality setting;
the equilibrium standard proﬁle under commitment sC, balances provision of incentives
ex ante with eﬃcient use of information ex post and is, therefor, ﬂatter than the equilibrium
proﬁle, sI, adopted under informed review. On the other hand, the equilibrium standard
implemented under blind review, sB, does not – by deﬁnition – depend on  and is, therefore,
completely ﬂat.
While neither informed or blind review is optimal in general, it is important to understand
when one of these two review policies is likely to out-perform the other from the principal’s
perspective. The complexity of the continuous-quality model makes it diﬃcult to answer this
question precisely, but Proposition 9 does provide some guidance. Speciﬁcally, there are two
conditions that make blind review relatively more attractive. First, If 2
y is small, then quality
is less random and the incentive term in (21) is large. Second, if ˆ  is close to , then nearly
every type of agent will exert more eﬀort under blind review than under informed review.
Example 7 (Continuous Quality). Suppose there are two possible types of agent,  2 f0:5;1:5g
occurring with equal probability. Also suppose v0  2
y  2
z  1 and u 
1
f0:5. It is straight-
forward to verify that ˆ x  v0  1, ensuring that both types of agent exert strictly higher eﬀort
under blind review than under informed review. The actual solutions and equilibrium pay-
oﬀs are presented in Table 7 and depicted in Figure 3. The ﬂat standard under blind review
informed blind
standard:   0:5 1.652 1.000
standard:   1:5 0.619 1.000
effort:   0:5 0.348 0.500
effort:   1:5 1.381 1.500
P’s payoff 1.290 1.334
elicits signiﬁcantly more eﬀort by both types of agent than the steeply declining standard aris-
ing under informed review. Indeed, the improvement in incentives more than oﬀsets the loss
31Figure 3: Solutions for Informed and Blind Review
of information in this example making blind review the preferred mode of evaluation for the
principal.
9 Conclusion
The issue at the heart of this paper concerns the tradeoﬀ between the eﬀective use of infor-
mation and the provision of incentives in a setting where commitment to a review standard
is infeasible. It was shown in this context that when the evaluator observes the innate ability
of the applicant, the equilibrium review policy is unduly biased – the standards facing high
ability applicants are too weak and those facing low-ability applicants are too tough. While
this policy uses information optimally ex post, it provides poor incentives ex ante. In particu-
lar, if the evaluator could commit to a review procedure, then she would implement a ﬂatter
(less biased) one. Commitment to such a policy is, however, often impractical or impossible
because of the subjective nature of many performance measures: the taste of a ﬁne wine, the
skill of a classical musician, the quality of an essay. Although it is not possible to commit to
a highly tailored acceptance procedure in such environments, it is often possible to commit
to remain ignorant of the identity (and hence the ability) of the applicant; that is, to perform
blind review.
The uniform standard implemented under blind review often provides good incentives for
agents at both ends of the ability distribution, but it sacriﬁces information at the project selec-
tion stage. Hence, whether the evaluator prefers blind or informed review depends critically
on whether incentives or project selection is more important to her. Blind review was shown
to be the preferred mode of evaluation if: the applicant pool contains a high proportion of
high ability agents, the applicant’s stakes from acceptance are relatively high, wrong decisions
are relatively less costly, or there is limited competition among evaluators.
There are a number of intriguing issues not addressed here. For instance, it would be inter-
esting to investigate the eﬀects of more general non-monetary incentive devices. In academia,
32for example, there is a whole gradation of rewards associated with acceptance (lead article,
long or short paper, best paper prize, and so on) that can be used to induce higher types to
exert more eﬀort. Similarly, it would also be interesting to study the role of peer eﬀects in a
setting where an applicant’s beneﬁt from acceptance, u is determined endogenously. Speciﬁ-
cally, the status or prestige enjoyed by an agent whose project is accepted might well depend
on the average quality of other projects accepted by the evaluator. It would likewise be instruc-
tive to study a dynamic version of the model in which the “ability” of an agent corresponds
to his history of prior acceptances and rejections. In particular, it would be useful to explore
the interaction between the review policies of evaluators and the career concerns of agents in
such a setting. While these and other avenues for further research in this area appear fruitful,
it seems quite likely that the basic message of this paper will remain in tact. Fairness is not
the only reason to level the playing ﬁeld – often it is also the best thing the evaluator can do.
Appendix
This appendix contains the proofs of all lemmas and propositions presented in the text as
well as the statement and proofs of two technical lemmas.
Proof of Proposition 1. Note ﬁrst that if a type  agent is subject to s suﬃciently close
to , then Ps; < 1; hence Vs;Ps; is strictly quasi-concave in s by Assumption 2.
This means sC   if and only if lims!
d
dsVs;Ps; > 0. Simply diﬀerentiating (4)
and noting lims! Ps;  0 and lims! RsPs;  uh   l by Assumption 1, we
ﬁnd sC   and thus pC  0 if and only if  <
r
u2hr 1l  C
 . Second, suppose
Ps; > 0. If we ignore the constraint Ps;  1, then by Assumption 2, sC  sC
0  is
the unique solution to
d
dsVsC
0 ;PsC
0 ;  0, or equivalently to (5). If PsC
0 ; > 1,
then sC  sC
0 ; rather sC  minfsjPs;  1g, because for Ps;  1, (4) reduces
to Vs;Ps;  v1   Fhs, which is strictly decreasing in s. By construction, sC is
continuous for   C
 . Since lims! Vs;p  0 for any p 2 0;1, sC is also continuous at
  C
 . This implies that pC  PsC;, pC is also continuous for all .
To prove that sC is strictly decreasing for  > C
 , note that for  2 C
 ;C
,
d
dsC sign
VpPs  VspP by Assumption 2. Since P 
P
 , and VpPs 
VpPs
 
 
Vs
 (where the last equality is due to the FOC), the r.h.s. simpliﬁes to VpPsVspP 
1
VspP Vs. From (3), Vss;p   pfhsv1 pfls` and Vsps;p   fhsv
`fls, which imply VspP   Vs   fls` < 0. Hence,
d
dsC < 0 for  > C
 . For
 > C
, we have PsC;  1, and thus
d
dsC   
P
Ps < 0, where Ps > 0 because
sC < s  R 11. As a result, sC is strictly decreasing for all  > C
 . From here, it
easily follows that pC is strictly increasing for  2 C
 ;C
.
33Finally, suppose lim!1 sC  sC > . Then, there is a suﬃciently large b  < 1 such that
pCb   1 and sCb  > . But in this case, the principal could strictly improve her payoﬀ,
v1   Fhs, by setting a standard, sCb   =2. Hence, lim!1 sC  . 
Proof of Lemma 1. Since, by deﬁnition, VsSp;p  UpPs;;s;  0, (1) and (3)
imply that
d
dsUPs;;s; 
@
@sUPs;;s; < 0 and
d
dsVSp;p 
@
@pVSp;p > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2. First observe that Vs;p is strictly quasi-concave in s because
R0s > 0. This means sI   if and only if lims! Vss;Ps; > 0. Since lims! Ps; 
0 and lims! RsPs;  uh l by Assumption 1, we have sI   and thus pI 
0 if and only if  <
r
uh l  I
 . Suppose  > I
 . Then, as argued in the text, sI 
sI
0, which is the smallest root to b S 1s;r Ps;  0, where b S 1s;r  S 1R 1r
1 p
p .
Diﬀerentiating with respect to , we ﬁnd
@
@
sI
0 
PsI
0;
b S 1
s sI
0;r   PssI
0;
.
Since b S 1
s sI
0;r < 0 by our equilibrium selection, b S 1
s sI
0;r   PssI
0; < 0 when-
ever PssI
0;  0. Now, consider PssI
0; < 0, and suppose, on the contrary, that
b S 1
s sI
0;r   PssI
0;  0. If b S 1
s sI
0;r   PssI
0;  0 for some , then by con-
tinuity, there is a suﬃciently small  > 0 such that sI
0  sI
0  . But, from (2), this
would imply pI < pI  , and thus sI
0  sI
0  , yielding a contradiction. Hence,
b S 1
s sI
0;r   PssI
0; > 0. However, if this were the case, then by continuity, we must
have b S 1
s sI
0 ;r PssI
0 ; < 0 for some  > 0. Given b S 1;r P; > 0, this
would generate another equilibrium with a greater eﬀort, contradicting our equilibrium selec-
tion. Thus, for sI
0  , it must be that b S 1
s sI
0;r   PssI
0; < 0. Hence,
@
@sI
0 < 0.
Next, we show pI < 1 for all . Clearly, if pIb   1 for some b  < 1, then sIb   S1 
, to which the agent would reply by pIb   0, contradicting pIb   1. Hence, pI < 1 for
all . Now, observe from (9) that pI 
r
rRsI
0, which reveals
@
@
pI   
rR0
r  R2
@
@
sI
0 > 0:
Finally, suppose lim!1 pI ! pI < 1. From (9), this implies lim!1 sI
0  I > . But
then, since FlI   FhI > 0, it must be that pI  1 by (2), yielding a contradiction. Hence,
pI  1 and I  .
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose  > C
 . Since C
  < I
 , clearly sC < sI   for
 2 C
 ;I
 . Next, note that C
 > : otherwise, if C
  , then there would be some ﬁnite
  C
 for which pI  1, contradicting Proposition 2.
Suppose  < , but, on the contrary, sC  sC
0   sI. Since sI > sI, it
follows that VssI;pI  0 and PssI; < 0, which imply
d
dsVs;Ps;
  
ssI < 0,
34and by Assumption 2 reveal sC < sI – a contradiction. Thus, sC < sI for  < .
Given C
 > , a similar line of argument shows that sC  sI, and sC > sI for
 <   C
. Finally, suppose  > C
. Then, sC  minfsjPs;  1g by Proposition 1. If ,
on the contrary, sC  sI, then since  > C
, we would have 1  PsC;  PsI;
because Pss; > 0 for  > C
. But this would imply pI  1, contradicting Proposition
1. Hence, sC > sI for  > C
. Finally, to prove pC  pI with strict inequality if
  , simply recall Pss; sign s   s whenever Ps; < 1. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Directly follows from (12), (13), and (14). 
Proof of Proposition 5. Since sI is strictly decreasing for  > I
 , and sB  sI, part
(i) immediately follows. To prove part (ii), note that Fls   Fhs is strictly quasi-concave in s,
achieving its unique maximum at s  s. If    so that sB  s, then pB > pI for all
  . Hence, EpB > EpI. If  <  so that sB > s, then the strict quasiconcavity
of Fls Fhs implies that there is a unique sl < s such that Fls Fhs > FlsB FhsB
if and only if s 2 sl;sB. Equivalently, since sI is strictly decreasing, there is a unique
h >  such that h is continuous and strictly decreasing in , and h  .
Moreover, pI > pB for  2 ;h and pI < pB for   ;h. This means
EpB > EpI if  is suﬃciently close to . The same line of argument holds if  is
strictly greater than but suﬃciently close to . Together it follows that there exists  > 0
such that j   j <  =) EpB > EpI. 
Proof of Lemma 2. To save on notation, let p  pI and s  sI in this proof, and
consider  > I
  so that p > 0. We ﬁrst prove the following claim.
Claim.
p00
p0s0 ! 1, as  ! 1.
Proof. Since p < 1 by Proposition 2, p  uFls Fhs. Diﬀerentiating with respect to
, we obtain
p0  uFls   Fhs  fls   fhss0
and
p00  ufls   fhs2s0  s00  f0
l s   f0
hss02:
Again, by Proposition 2, we know p ! 1 and s !  as  ! 1. Suppose s0 ! a < 0. Then,
p0 ! ufl   fha < 0; which contradicts p0 > 0, because fl   fh > 0. Hence,
s0 ! 0, which implies s0 ! 0:
Note that
p0
s0  u
Fls Fhs
s0 fls fhs. Moreover, by L’Hospital rule, lim!1
Fls Fhs
s0 
lim!1
fls fhss0
s0s00 . This means for a suﬃciently large ,
p0
s0  ufls fh
2s0s00
s0s00 . Since
p0
s0 < 0, fl   fh > 0 and s0 < 0, we must have s0  s00 > 0 and 2s0  s00 < 0. Now,
observe that since s0 ! 0 and s00 > 0, it follows s00 ! 0. Using L’Hospital rule,
s0
s00 
s00
s000 for a
suﬃciently large , implying that s000 < 0. A similar limit argument shows that
Fls Fhs
s0 
35fl fhs0
s00 
f0
l  f0
hs02fl fhs00
s000 . Given s000 < 0, the numerator of the last ratio
must be positive, or, equivalently
f0
l  f0
h
fl fh >  
s00
s02. Next, consider the following ratio:
p00
p0s0 
ufls   fhs2s0  s00  f0
l s   f0
hss02
p0s0 :
Dividing the r.h.s. by s02, we obtain
p00
p0s0 
fls   fhs
2s0s00
s02  f0
l s   f0
hs
p0
s0
u:
Thus, for a large 
p00
p0s0 
fl   fh
2s0s00
s02  f0
l    f0
h
fl   fh
2s0s00
s0s00
u

s0  s00
s02 u 
f0
l    f0
h
fl   fh
s0  s00
2s0  s00u
>
s0  s00
s02 u  
s00
s02
s0  s00
2s0  s00u

s0  s00
2s0  s00
2
s0u  1,
where the last line follows because p0   
p2R0
r s0 and R0 < 1, revealing
p0
s0   
p2R0
r ! 0 
as  ! 1. Furthermore, given
p0
s0  ufl   fh
2s0s00
s0s00 , we have
2s0s00
s0s00 !  1, which,
together with
2
s0 !  1, proves the claim.
Now, note that
VI00  Vpss0p0  Vpp00, (A1)
where Vss;p   pfhsv  1   pfls` and Vpss;p   fhsv   `fls.
As  ! I
 , since s ! , we have Vps !  fhv   `fl < 0 and Vp ! 0. Hence,
VI00 > 0. Finally, for  ! 1, we have s ! , Vps !  fhv   `fl < 0 and Vp !
v  ` > 0. Moreover, since, by the Claim,
p00
p0s0 ! 1, the second term in (A1) dominates, and
given p00 < 0, implies VI00 < 0.
Overall, there exist two cutpoints I
  < L  H < 1 such that VI is strictly convex for
 < L and strictly concave for  > H. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose  < L  H < , where L and H are the two
cutpoints deﬁned in Lemma 2, and by deﬁnition, they are independent of type distribution. Let
GH  GH < =H. Since VI is strictly concave for  > H, Jensen’s inequality implies
36 R
H
VI
dG
1 GH < VI
 R
H

dG
1 GH , or equivalently
 R
H
VIdG < 1   GHVI
 R
H

dG
1 GH . Then,
EV < 1   GHVI
  
H R

dG
1   GH
 
H Z

VIdG
 1   GHVI
   HGH
1   GH
  VIHGH  ØGH
Note that Ø00  VIH   VI     HVI0 < 0 because VI is strictly concave for
 > H by hypothesis, and GH  0 implies  > H. Note also that Ø0  VI. Thus, there is
some B > 0 such that EV < VI whenever GH < B. A similar line of argument shows
that there is some I > 0 such that EV > VI whenever GL  GL > 1 I, completing
the proof of part (i).
To prove the second part, ﬁx a type distribution G, and let b   u 2 u;u so that
b Gub   G

u. Clearly, b GuH  G
H
u  ! 0 as u ! 1, which implies that there is some
uH > 0 such that b GuH < B for all u > uH. Applying the result from part (i), we then have
EV < VI for all u > uH. A parallel line of argument reveals that there is some uL > 0
such that b GuL > 1   I for all u < uL, and thus EV > VI. 
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose ` > 0 and ` > 0. Note ﬁrst that Vpss;p < 0,
Vp;p  v  ` > 0, and Vp;p   ` < 0. Thus, there is a unique sd 2 ; such that
Vps;p sign sd   s. In equilibrium under informed review, the exact argument in the proof
of Proposition 2 reveals that sI   (and pI  0) if and only if  <
r
uh l  
I
 . Thus,
V
I
  0 for  < 
I
 . The arguments in Proposition 2 also show
d
dsI < 0 and
d
dpI > 0
for   
I
 . Let   
I
 . Then,
d
dV
I
 
d
dVsI;pI  VpsI;pI
d
dpI. Since
d
dpI > 0, this implies
d
dV
I
 sign sd   sI, and since
d
dsI < 0, it also implies that
there is a unique d > 
I
  such that
d
dV
I
 < 0 for  < d and
d
dV
I
 > 0 for  > d.
Clearly, V
I
 < 0 for   d. Given that
d
dV
I
 > 0 for  > d and V
I
 > 0 for a
suﬃciently large , there is a unique 
I
r > d such that V
I

I
r  0 and thus V
I
 < 0 for
 2 d;
I
r. Overall, there exist two types 
I
  and 
I
r such that V
I
  0 if   
I
  or   
I
r;
V
I
 < 0 if  2 
I
 ;
I
r); and V
I
 > 0 if  > 
I
r, proving part (i).
To prove part (ii), note that since, under commitment, setting sC   is always feasible
for the principal, V
C
  0 for all . Note also that type   
I
  
r
uh l is not prescreened
under commitment if and only if V
C

I
  > 0. Let   
I
    for  > 0. By deﬁnition,
sI < , and  !  as ` ! 1. Suppose sC < . Then, VCsC;pC 
 1   FhsC` < 0 for a small  and large `, which means the principal is better oﬀ
setting sC  . 
37Proof of Lemma 3. Integrating by parts and arranging terms, (17) simpliﬁes to:
Hm1;  21   
Z m1

Gd  m1     0: (A2)
Note that Hm1; is strictly increasing in m1 and that H;  0 and H; > 0. Thus,
there is a unique solution m1  1 to (A2), and its boundary values are 10   and
11  . Furthermore, 1 is strictly increasing, because Hm1;   2
R m1
 Gd 
m1    < 0 for m1  . 
Proof of Lemma 4. Recall that

B;I
1   1  

2
G1 

2
1   G1VI1
and

B;I
2  

2
Z 1

VIdG  1  

2

Z 
1
VIdG:
From Lemma 3, we have 
B;I
1 0  0 and 
B;I
1 1 
1
2VI. Next, we diﬀerentiate 
B;I
1 
to obtain
d
d

B;I
1   1 G1

2

d
d
VI10
1  G11 g10
1 
1
2
VI1 > 0;
where  G1  1   g10
1 
1
2  0 follows from (17).
Again, from Lemma 3, we have 
B;I
2 0  EVI and 
B;I
2 1 
1
2EVI. Diﬀerentiat-
ing 
B;I
2  yields
d
d

B;I
2  
1
2

Z 1

VIdG  
Z 
1
VIdG   1   VI1g10
1 < 0:
Proof of Proposition 8. Suppose
1
2VI < EVI < VI. Since 0 <
1
2EVI <
1
2VI, by Lemma 4 there is 1 2 0;1 such that 
B;I
1  <
1
2EVI if and only if  <
1. Moreover, since
1
2EVI <
1
2VI < EVI, by Lemma 4 there is also 2 2 0;1
such that 
B;I
2  >
1
2VI if and only if  < 2. Deﬁne   minf1;2g and  
maxf1;2g. Clearly, 0 <    < 1. If  < , then 
B;I
1  <
1
2EVI and 
B;I
2  >
1
2VI, which imply that choosing informed review is a strictly dominant strategy for each
evaluator, and thus the unique equilibrium has 1  2  I. A similar argument shows that
if  > , then choosing blind review is a strictly dominant strategy for each evaluator, and
thus the unique equilibrium has 1  2  B. Suppose    and  2 ;. If
  2 and   1, then there are exactly two equilibria: 1  2  I and 1  2  B.
If, on the other hand,   1 and   2, then there are also two equilibria: i  B and
j  I for i;j  1;2 and i  j. 
Proof of Proposition 9. First we state and prove a useful technical lemma.
38Lemma A1. Z 1
 1
yfzs   x   yfyydy 
fs   xs   x2
y
2
y  2
z
Proof. Observe that
Fzs   x   yfyy 

2
q
2
z2
y
 1
exp

 s   x   y2=22
z   y2=22
y

:
Combining terms in the exponential yields
s   x   y2
22
z

y2
22
y


2
y  2
z
h
y2   2y

2
y=

2
y  2
z

s   x
i
 2
ys   x2
22
y2
z
:
Completing the square for the term in brackets gives

2
y  2
z

y   2
y=2
y  2
zs   x
2
22
y2
z

s   x2
2

2
y  2
z
:
Note that
fs   x 
 r
2

2
y  2
z
! 1
exp
0
@ 
s   x2
2

2
y  2
z

1
A:
Combining this with the previous expression gives
fzs   x   yfyy  fs   x
p
2w2
 1
exp
0
B
@ 

y   2
ys   x=2
y  2
z
2
2w2
1
C
A;
where
w2 
2
y2
z
2
y  2
z
:
Using this fact yields
Z 1
 1
yfzs x yfyydy  fs x
Z 1
 1
y
p
2w2
 1
exp
0
B
@ 

y   2
ys   x=2
y  2
z
2
2w2
1
C
A:
Noting that the integral on the right is the expected value of a Normally distributed random
variable with mean 2
ys   x=

2
y  2
z

completes the proof.
Each case of Proposition 9 is now proven in turn.
(i) For the commitment case, maximize the evaluator’s payoﬀ (18) with respect to s and x,
subject to the agent’s reaction function (20). Letting  denote the Lagrange multiplier,
the ﬁrst-order conditions are
fs   xv0   x  
Z 1
 1
yfzs   x   yfyydy  uf0
s   x  0 (A3)
39and
 
"
fs   xv0   x  
Z 1
 1
yfzs   x   yfyydy  uf0
s   x
#
1 Fs x   0:
(A4)
Noting from (A3) that the bracketed expression in (A4) is zero yields   1   Fs   x.
Substituting this into (A3) and invoking Lemma A1 gives
fs   x
 
v0   x  
s   x2
y
2
y  2
z
!
 1   Fs   xf0
s   x  0;
or
s 
 
2
y  2
z
2
y
! 
v0 
1   Fs   xf 0
s   x
fs   x
!
  x
2
z
2
y
:
Noting that
f0s   x
fs   x

x   s
2
y  2
z
completes the proof for this case.
(ii) for the informed-review case, maximize the evaluator’s payoﬀ (??) with respect to s. The
ﬁrst-order condition is
fs   xv0   x  
Z 1
 1
yfzs   x   yfyydy  0:
Invoking Lemma A1 and solving for s completes the proof for this case.
(iii) For the blind-review case, compute the expected value of the evaluator’s payoﬀ (18) with
respect to . Then maximize this with respect to s to get the ﬁrst-order condition
Z 

 
fs   xBv0   xB 
Z 1
 1
yfzs   xB   yfyydy
!
gd  0:
Invoking Lemma A1 and solving for s completes the proof for this case.
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